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Gregory et al.: The Labor Law Jurisprudence of Wilma Liebman

THE LABOR LAW JURISPRUDENCE OF WILMA
LIEBMAN
DavidL. Gregory,*Ian Hayes," & Amanda Jaret***
INTRODUCTION

Wilma Liebman is the exemplar of the dedicated, intrepid public
servant.
This article will focus especially upon her influential,
courageous leadership of the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB").
Appointed to the NLRB by President Clinton on November 14, 1997,'
she became the often lone voice of dissent against the wave of antiunion, pro-employer decisions rendered by the archconservative NLRB
majority throughout the tenure of President George W. Bush.2
In an exquisite twist of political fate, one of the first official acts of
President Obama was his appointment of Wilma Liebman to chair the
NLRB.3 With the nearly absolute and deeply enigmatic vanishment, not
to say banishment, of Obama Labor Secretary Hilda Solis from the
public limelight, Wilma Liebman quickly became the de facto Frances
Perkins equivalent of the Obama administration.4 Wilma Liebman's
* The Dorothy Day Professor of Law and the Executive Director of the Center for Labor and
Employment Law, St. John's University School of Law, Queens, New York; J.S.D., 1987, Yale
Law School.
** St. John's Law Class of 2013, Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development Notes and
Articles Editor, 2011 Peggy Browning Fellow, 2012-13 Monsignor Thomas J. Darby Memorial
Scholar for Excellence in Labor And Employment Law, 2012 Cesar Chavez Scholar for Excellence
in Labor and Employment Law, and Junior Fellow of the Center for Labor and Employment Law.
*** St. John's Law Class of 2013, St. John's Law Review Symposium Editor, 2011 John Boyd
Scholar for Excellence in Labor And Employment Law, 2012-13 Professor Lawrence Joseph
Scholar for Excellence in Labor And Employment Law, 2012 Cesar Chavez Scholar for Excellence
in Labor and Employment Law, and Junior Fellow for the Center for Labor and Employment Law.
1. Wilma B. Liebman, Chairman - National Labor Relations Board, COMMITTEE ON
APPROPRIATIONS,

U.S.

HOUSE

OF

REPRESENTATIVES,

http://appropriations.house.gov/_files/04061 lWilmaLiebmanBio.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).
2. See Christopher T. Hexter, Schuchat, Cook & Werner, Presentation at the University of
Missouri Extension Labor Law Breakfast: Like a Tornado - The "Obama" Board's Course
Correction - But How Long Will It Last 2 (Jan.. 12, 2011), available at
http://www.local562.org/upload/4d51a3968dc51.PDF.
3. Wilma Liebman, ALLGov, http://www.allgov.com/Official/Liebman Wilma (last visited
Nov. 1, 2012).
4. Frances Perkins was the first woman appointed to the United States Cabinet. Social
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visibility steadily and sharply increased as she endeavored to undo a
significant series of aberrational ultra-conservative decisions by the
reactionary super majority wing of the NLRB throughout the tenure of
President George W. Bush. With the deeply controversial pursuit of
Boeing by the NLRB's then-Acting General Counsel, the NLRB chaired
by Liebman became a bull's eye for the Republican attack machine.5 By
the fall of 2011, many influential Republican senators vowed to
effectively shut down the NLRB with the presumed help of a Republican
president after the November 2012 elections.6 Throughout it all, Wilma
Liebman remained resolute. Indeed, in addition to effectuating
significant rectifications to the case law of the NLRB, her deep influence
on National Labor Relations Act (the "Act" or "NLRA") policy and
procedure seems likely to continue beyond her departure from the Board
in the summer of 2011.7
I. LEGAL CAREER BEFORE APPOINTMENT TO THE NLRB

Wilma Liebman, a native of Philadelphia, attended Barnard College
and George Washington University Law School.8 From 1974 to 1980,
Liebman worked for the NLRB, first as a staff attorney from 1974 to
1978 with the Board's Division of Advice, and from 1978 to 1980 in the
Oakland, California regional office.9 She then served as in-house
counsel for the Teamsters until 1990, when she became an attorney for
the Bricklayers Union until 1993.1o

She reentered federal government service as the Deputy Director of
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service." During her time with
Security
Pioneers
Frances
Perkins,
Soc.
SECURITY
ONLINE,
http://www.ssa.gov/history/fperkins.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). She represented the labor
movement in crafting the New Deal and was a strong voice and public face advocating on behalf of
workers' interests. See id. Through her decisions, Wilma Liebman occupied the same kind of role
during her service on the Board. See infra Part II.A.
5. The Board withdrew the case after Boeing and the International Association of
Machinists reached a settlement. Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board Drops Case Against Boeing
After
Union
Reaches
Accord,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
9,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/10/business/labor-board-drops-case-against-boeing.html
[hereinafter Greenhouse, Board Drops Case Against Boeing]. Although the Boeing case settled, the
underlying issues that caused the political firestorm remain unresolved. See id
6. See id.
7. See Hexter, supranote 2, at 3.
8. NLRB
Chairman
Wilma
B.
Liebman,
LAWMEMO,
http://www.lawmemo.com/nlrb/liebman.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2012).
9. Wilma Liebman, supra note 3.

10.
11.

Id.
Id.
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the Service, Liebman participated in mediations that helped revive the
stalled labor negotiations during the 1994-95 Major League Baseball
strike.12
II. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD MEMBER, 1997-2009-THE
EMERGENCE OF THE BUSH II BOARD'S "GREAT DISSENTER"
Liebman was appointed one of the designated Democratic members
of the Board by President Clinton on November 14, 1997.13 Despite her
history of neutral government service, Liebman was generally expected
to harbor a union-side preference because of her private practice
background. 14 Her voting record corresponded with these expectations;
during her first three years on the Board, she voted in favor of the union
position in 92% of cases.15 The political composition of the Board was
predominantly liberal during the balance of the Clinton administration.16
Consequently, she was often in the majority.
Although the NLRB decisions during the Clinton years, 1992-2000,
were frequently favorable to the labor side, the Bush II Board, 20012009, bolstered by new deeply conservative appointees, unleashed a
torrent of staunchly pro-management opinions.17 Liebman soon found
herself in an increasingly marginalized position on the Board and
frequently penned dissenting opinions. Several of the most important
decisions from this time of the ascendant radical right are critically
analyzed below.' 8

12. Murray Chass, BASEBALL; New Game in Town as Baseball Talks Begin, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 24, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/24/sports/baseball-new-game-in-town-asbaseball-talks-begin.html.
13. Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board's Exiting Leader Responds to Critics, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/30/business/national-labor-boards-leader-leavesamid-criticism.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0.
14. See Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board: The Transformation of the
NLRB, 1935-2000,61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1407 n.185 (2000).
15. Id at 1412. While this may seem like a surprising figure, it is worth noting that Member
Hurtgen decided in favor of management in nearly 97% of cases during the same time period, and
Members Browning and Fox decided in favor of unions in 98% and 91% of cases, respectively. Id
at 1411-12.
16. See id. at 1366.
17. See Anne Marie Lofaso, The Persistenceof Union Repression in an Era of Recognition,
62 ME. L. REv. 199, 230-31 (2010) (characterizing the Bush H Board as "willing to erode the
protections provided for workers using the very law that was intended to safeguard those
protections.").
18. Because space prohibits a comprehensive treatment of the Board's decisions during this
era, only cases to which Liebman contributed substantially will be considered here. For a more
general but thorough treatment of the Board's cases during the Bush board, see Catherine L. Fisk &
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A. "Employee" Cases
At the close of the Clinton Board's tenure and during the Bush II
administration, a series of decisions assessed the statutory classification
of certain workers. These cases provide valuable insight into the
oscillations of the increasingly politicized Board. Although the NLRA
only secures the organizational and collective bargaining rights of those
who are defined as "employees" within the meaning of the statute, 19 the
text of the "Definitions" section 2(3) is particularly unhelpful in
establishing parameters for those who might constitute a statutory
"employee" and therefore be entitled to these protections. It states
cryptically that "the term 'employee' shall include any employee ....
",20 Although this definition is subject to several exceptions, the Board
has repeatedly noted that the "'breadth of [section] 2(3)'s definition is
striking."' 2 1 Because the language of the Act itself can be unhelpful in
resolving the important threshold question of who is an "employee," the
issue has been frequently litigated.
During Liebman's tenure on the Board, how the members chose to
resolve the question of who constituted an "employee" fluctuated
dramatically, paradoxically making the inherently volatile issue a
reliable barometer of the Board's political preferences. 22 This issue
often had more than merely semantic significance; the inclusion of
graduate students within the statutory meaning of "employee," for
instance, comprised a population "among whom organizing had spread
rapidly."23
The Board's first major foray during the Clinton administration into
resolving the question of statutory "employee" status as applied to
medical interns, residents, and clinical fellows was Boston Medical
Center.24 Although there were two cases from the 1970s holding that
medical interns or residents were students, not employees, 25 the Board
Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems with Its Structure and
Function andSuggestions for Reform, 58 DuKE L.J. 2013 (2009).
19. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
20. Id. § 152(3).
21. Bos. Med. Ctr., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 160 (1999) (quoting Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467
U.S. 883, 891-92 (1984)).
22. See Fisk & Malamud, supra note 18, at 2073-77 (discussing Boston Medical Center and
two subsequent decisions).
23. Id. at 2073.
24. Bos. Med. Ctr., 330 N.L.R.B. at 152.
25. See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251, 253 (1976) (explaining that because
intems, residents, and clinical fellows are primarily students, they do not fit the statutory definition
of "employees" within the meaning of section 2(3) of the Act); St. Clare's Hosp. & Health Ctr., 229
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overruled them and found instead that "while they may be students
learning their chosen medical craft," interns, residents, and clinical
fellows "are also 'employees' within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the
Act." 26 The Board majority relied both on evidence of actual practices
in hospitals 27 and on the common law analysis of the master-servant
relationship in deciding that medical interns are "employees" and
compared them to apprentices. 28 Liebman joined the majority in making
this determination.29
With respect to graduate students, the Board also reversed and
restored precedent. As in Boston Medical Center, the Board initially
faced two cases from the 1970s that purported to establish graduate
teaching assistants' status as primarily students, not employees.30 In
New York University,3 1 the Board affirmed the logic of Boston Medical
Center and extended the "historic, broad and literal reading" of section
2(3)'s definition of "employee" to embrace graduate students.32 The
majority's decision was underscored by the same concerns about the
practical realities of the students' work and their relationship to the
university as "indistinguishable from a traditional master-servant
relationship."33
While Liebman joined the majority in both Boston Medical Center
and New York University, she dissented when the Bush II Board dealt
with this issue quite differently in Brown University.34 By declaring that
graduate students are not "employees" within the meaning of section
2(3) of the Act, the majority declined to grant them collective bargaining
rights.35 This was largely based on the majority's belief that "there is a
significant risk, and indeed a strong likelihood, that the collective-

N.L.R.B. 1000, 1004 (1977) (withholding collective bargaining rights for hospital house staff
because of the academic nature of their work).
26. Bos. Med. Ctr., 330 N.L.R.B. at 152.
27. Id. at 163 (including the realities of employment relationships).
28. Id. at 160 (noting that because the students receive compensation and benefits and spend
the majority of their time providing patient care, they are employees under common law principles).
29. See id. at 152.
30. Compare Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 640 (1972) (excluding graduate students
from a faculty bargaining unit because they are primarily students and as such lack a sufficient
community interest with the regular faculty) with Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 621,
623 (1974) (finding that research assistants are akin to the graduate students contemplated by
Adelphi Univ. and refusing to recognize a bargaining unit of such non-employees).
31. 332 N.L.R.B. 1205 (2000).
32. Id. at 1205.
33. Id. at 1206.
34. 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004) (Member Liebman, dissenting).
35. Id. at 493.
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bargaining process will be detrimental to the educational process."36
Liebman dissented and criticized this approach as a stark political
maneuver that failed to pay due regard to the language of section 2(3),
an approach that was "woefully out of touch with contemporary
academic reality."38 She traced the transformation of universities into
increasingly complex corporations and justified graduate students
organizing on this basis, noting that "even those who live the life of the
mind must eat."39 Accordingly, she admonished the majority for
behaving "as if there was no room in the ivory tower for a sweatshop." 4 0
She noted the increasing prevalence of graduate student collective
bargaining as well as the firm statutory basis for including these workers
within the protective ambit of the Act.4 1
Liebman also emphasized the practical impacts of the majority's
decision. Not only did the Board's decision allow universities to avoid
dealing with graduate student unions, it also tacitly authorized retaliation
against graduate students who act together to improve their working
conditions.4 2 Liebman charged that this decision ran counter to over
thirty years of experience with the viability of collective bargaining in
the academic context.43
The Board's handling of graduate students is a recurring theme that
receives different treatment as the Board members' attitudes and
political affiliations change. Although Liebman was not presented with
this issue during her tenure as Chair of the Obama Board, the arguments
she set forth in her eminently quotable dissent may be vindicated by her
successors." The NLRB has agreed to reconsider the Brown doctrine
and may revert to the prior policy under New York University.45
36. Id.
37. Id. at 496.
38. Id. at 493. It is glaringly obvious that graduate teaching assistants at many major public
state universities, ranging from the University of Illinois to the University of California at Berkeley,
have achieved the protections of state labor law without compromising their academic or worker
identities and functions. For a more in-depth look at the graduate teaching assistant student or
employee controversy, see Grant M. Hayden, "The University Works Because We Do": Collective
BargainingRightsfor GraduateAssistants,69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1233 (2001).
39. Id. at 498.
40. Id. at 494.
41. See id at 493-94.
42. Id at 494.
43. See id
44. See Mitchell H. Rubinstein, NLRB About to Again Flip on Issue of Graduate Students
Employee
Status,
ADJUNCT
LAW
PROF
BLOG
(Nov.
1,
2010),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/adjunctprofs/nlrb/page/2/.
45. The Board agreed to reconsider the Brown decision in New York Univ., 356 N.L.R.B. No.
7, 2010 WL 4386482 (Oct. 25, 2010).
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Finally, the Board considered the "employee" status of union
organizers who worked as "salts" in Toering Electric Co.46 Just as the
status of graduate students was politically significant because of their
apparent proclivity towards unionization, the classification of "salts"
was sensitive because of unions' increasing reliance on salting as an
organizational tactiC47 after the Supreme Court's pro-employer decision
sharply restricted non-employee organizers' rights to be on company
property in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB. 48
The Board's decision drew Liebman's ire, and she issued another
incendiary dissent. Liebman contended that the majority dispensed with
a carefully considered framework for how to balance salts' and
employers' interests and effectively legalized hiring discrimination
established by the Board's decision in FES.49 She was chagrined but
"not surprise[ed]" to report that "the majority's view rests on no real
authority at all."5
Instead, the majority hastily dismissed bedrock
Supreme Court precedent and rendered a decision that would hinder the
administration of the Act's major mandates-namely, "uncovering,
redressing, and deterring hiring discrimination."s Liebman insisted that
the majority's "decision represents a failure in the administration of the
National Labor Relations Act."52 In her view, this was because the
majority simultaneously overturned carefully considered precedent,
failed to implement a workable approach to achieving its professed
goals, and created a new form of legal hiring discrimination.5 3
B. The NLRB Meets the Computer (or Not?!): Register-Guard and Rip
Van Winkle
Register-Guard4 may be the paradigmatic case of the polarized
ideological politics of the Bush II Board. It also exemplifies the Board's
dramatic and inexplicable unwillingness squarely to confront the unique

46. 351 N.L.R.B. 225 (2007).
47. See Victor J. Van Bourg & Ellyn Moscowitz, Salting the Mines: The Legal and Political
Implications of PlacingPaid Union Organizersin the Employer's Workplace, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 1, 15 (1998).
48. 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
49. Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. at 238 (Member Liebman, dissenting) (citing FES, 331
N.L.R.B. 9 (2000)).
50. Id at 242.
51. Id at 240.
52. Id at 245.
53. Id
54. Guard Publ'g Co. (Register-Guardl), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110 (2007).
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challenges posed by the Internet and other manifestations of
The Board's failure to acknowledge the
technological change. 5
importance of accommodating e-mail communication within the section
7 framework disappointed many onlookers.
The Board's Register-Guard case concerned union president Suzi
Prozanski's use of an employer's computer system during non-working
time to send union-related e-mails.s? The employer was a newspaper
publisher that maintained a communication systems policy expressly
proscribing e-mails intended "to solicit or proselytize for commercial
ventures, religious or political causes, outside organizations, or other
Notwithstanding this general
non-job-related solicitations."5 8
sent
e-mails that were unrelated to
prohibition, employees frequently
59
work. The employer was aware that the e-mail system was being used
for non-work-related purposes, including baby announcements, party
invitations, offers of sports tickets, requests for services like dog
walking, and solicitations for the employer's periodic United Way
charitable campaign.60 Despite the employer's general leniency about
non-work-related e-mails, Prozanski's use of the e-mail system on three
occasions to circulate union-related information was not excused. She
*
was issued two
written warnings. 62
The majority in Register-GuardI determined that Prozanski's use
of the employer's computer system during non-working time to send
63
Accordingly, the
union-related e-mails was not protected activity.
employer was held to be free to discipline an employee for such activity,
even in light of evidence that the policy had been discriminatorily
The majority grounded its
applied to union-related e-mails. 4
determination in the employer's "basic property right to 'regulate and

55. See David L. Gregory, Unsafe Workplaces, Injured Employees, and the Bizarre
Bifurcation of Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, Ill W. VA. L. REv. 395, 397 n.l 1
(2009) (describing Register-Guardas an example of the Board's "spasmodic and unreal failure to
understand the labor law ramifications of cyberspace.").
56. For a fine discussion of the far-ranging implications of Register-Guard,see Jeffrey M.
Hirsch, The Silicon Bullet: Will the Internet Kill the NLRA?, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 262, 277-78
(2008).
57. See Register-GuardI, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1111-12.
58. Id.at1111.
59. Id
60. Id
61. Id.atllll-12.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1114.
64. Seeid.atlll8.
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restrict employee use of company property."' 6 5 It refused to treat e-mail
communications as analogous to face-to-face solicitations that would
undoubtedly receive section 7 protection under Supreme Court and
Board precedent.66 Nevertheless, the majority purported to recognize the
"substantial impact" e-mail has had "on how people communicate, both
at and away from the workplace."6 7
Liebman's strongly worded dissent critiqued the Board's lethargic
reaction to the revolutionary changes to the workplace landscape that
had been brought about as a result of technological progress and the
near-ubiquity of computer-mediated work.68 She concluded that the
majority's decision on this issue of first impression "confirms that the
NLRB has become the 'Rip Van Winkle of administrative agencies."' 6 9
Liebman likened the Board to Rip Van Winkle because "[o]nly a Board
that has been asleep for the past 20 years could fail to recognize that email has revolutionized communication both within and outside the
workplace."7 o The majority's decision failed, on Liebman's view,
because it allowed e-mail, a unique and revolutionary form of media, to
be "treated just as the law treats bulletin boards, telephones, and pieces
of scrap paper." 7 1
Liebman also challenged with equal ferocity the apparent lack of a
legal justification for the Board's decision.72 She emphasized the
importance of safeguarding workers' ability to engage in Section 7
activities.73 She analogized the use of the Internet to the kind of
solicitation the Supreme Court enshrined as protected concerted activity
in Republic Aviation Corp. over sixty years earlier.74 Consistent with
existing precedent,75 she recommended that employers should aim to
impose rules that have the least restrictive limitations on employees'
communication rights that still protect the employer's property

65. Id. (quoting Union Carbide Corp. v. NLRB, 714 F.2d 657, 663 (6th Cir. 1983)).
66. Register-Guard I, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1115 (discussing the inapplicability of Republic
Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945)).
67. Register-Guardl,351 N.L.R.B. at 1116.
68. See id at 1121 (Member Liebman, dissenting).
69. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Thill, Inc., 980 F.2d 1137, 1142 (7th Cir. 1992)).
70. Register-Guardl,351 N.L.R.B. at 1121.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1121-22.
73. See id. at 1123-24.
74. Id. at 1123-24.
75. See, e.g., NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956) (explaining that
accommodation between Section 7 rights and employer property rights "must be obtained with as
little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other.").
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interests.
Because the overbroad communication systems policy at
issue in this case captured legitimate employee section 7 activity,
Liebman maintained that the Board paid too much heed to the
employer's attenuated property interest at the expense of the employees'
clear right to communicate in this fashion.
Liebman's commitment to modernizing Board precedent and
ensuring that the Act retains vitality in an increasingly complex and
technologically advanced workplace is one of the most fundamental
aspects of her legacy. She consistently championed employees' rights to
make use of new technology to conduct section 7 activities throughout
her time as a member and eventually as Chairman of the Board.
Liebman's stance against the epidemic pro-employer tendency to
encroach upon union members' section 7 communication rights is
another salient feature of her legacy. In a fitting coda to the original
Register-Guardsaga, by July 2011, when Liebman was serving as Chair,
Register-Guard again came before the Board.79 Contrary to the
Register-Guard Board majority, the D.C. Circuit determined that the
communication systems policy was discriminatorily enforced against
Prozanski for her union solicitations.o Without fanfare or extended
discussion, the Board accepted the legal conclusions of the D.C. Circuit
as accurate statements of the law and issued an order requiring the
employer to rescind its disciplinary actions against Prozanski.
C. EBM Corp. and the Radical Narrowing of the Scope of Weingarten
Rights

The existence of so-called Weingarten rights for non-unionized
employees has been a perennial and always hotly contested issue for the
Board.82 The Supreme Court announced the existence of a certain
76.

Register-Guardl,351 N.L.R.B. at 1123.

77.

See id. at 1132.

78. See Seth Borden, NLRB Chair Wilma Liebman's Term Expires at Midnight: What's
2011),
27,
(Aug.
TODAY
RELATIONS
LABOR
Next?,
http://www.laborrelationstoday.com/2011/08/articles/nlrb-administration/nlrb-chair-wilmaliebmans-term-expires-at-midnight-whats-next/.
79. The case appeared on remand from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See
Guard Publ'g Co. v. NLRB, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
80. Id. at 59.
81. See Guard Publ'g Co. (Register-Guardll), 357 N.L.R.B. No. 27, 2011 WL 3151776
(July 26, 2011).
82. See, e.g., IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1306 (2004) (Member Liebman, dissenting)
("The right to representation in nonunion workplaces has had a surprisingly fitful history.");
Christine Neylon O'Brien, The NLRB Waffling on Weingarten Rights, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 111, 114
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measure of due process for employees acting "in concert for mutual aid
and protection" in its decision in NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc.83 by
permitting them to seek union representation in investigatory
interviews. 84 The Court recognized that an employee could avail herself
of this right when five circumstances are present. First, the employee
must be engaged in concerted protected activity within the meaning of
section 7 of the Act. Second, an employee must affirmatively request
union representation in such an interview.
Next, the employee
requesting union representation during an interview may only do so if
the circumstances are such that she "reasonably believes the
investigation will result in disciplinary action."87 The employee's
request for representation also may not abridge legitimate employer
88
prerogatives. Finally, the employer is under no duty to bargain with the
union representative who is attending the interview.8 9
In IBM Corp.,9o the Board majority substantially curtailed nonunionized employees' Weingarten rights to be accompanied by coworkers during investigations made by their employers.9 1 Although the
Board had located Weingarten rights for non-union employees a mere
four years earlier in Epilepsy Foundation of Northeast Ohio,92 the
majority summarily abandoned that precedent.93 Growing concerns
about national security, raised sua sponte by the Board, purportedly
animated the majority's deeply controversial IBM decision. 9 4
Liebman dissented. She contended that the majority's holding
meant that "the overwhelming majority of employees" would be
"stripped of a right integral to workplace democracy."95 She principally
argued that this rule would unnecessarily abridge employees' section 7
rights, explaining that "[w]orkers without unions can and do successfully
stand up for each other on the job-and they have the legal right to try,
(2005) (describing the inconsistent findings of non-unionized employees' Weingarten rights as a
function of the shifting political accountabilities of Board members).
83. 420 U.S. 251, 256-57 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. See id. at 260.
85. Id. at 256-57.
86. Id. at 257.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 258.
89. Id. at 259.
90. 341 N.L.R.B. 1288 (2004).
91. See id. at 1288.
92. 331 N.L.R.B. 676 (2000).
93. IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. at 1288.
94. Id. at 1290.
95. Id. at 1305 (Member Liebman, dissenting).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2012

11

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 3

38

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 30:27

whether or not they succeed." 6 Liebman called the majority's bluff on
its trumped-up claims of dormant security threats lurking within nonunion employees' accompaniment to investigatory interviews by adding
that "we would hope that the American workplace has not yet become a
new front in the war on terrorism and that the Board would not be
Because the
leading the charge, unbidden by other authorities."9
majority needlessly and abruptly stripped them of the due process rights
afforded by Weingarten, Liebman contended that the IBM rule disserved
two of the key purposes of the Act-providing "a vehicle for employee
voice and a system for resolving workplace disputes." 9 8
Journalists99 and legal commentatorsoo alike widely and rapidly
recognized the IBM decision's reverberations. Because accompaniment
during such interviews can be crucial and because co-workers may serve
as valuable witnesses and can deter employers' misuse of their power or
intimidation tactics, 0 it is apparent why IBM generated so much
discussion. Liebman's final criticism of the majority's decision is
apposite to describe many others that arose during the Bush II era and
encapsulates her role. as the lone voice of dissent. She stated, simply,
that the members of the majority had overruled sound precedent, "not
because they must, and not because they should, but because they
can."l 02
D. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc. and TransformingEmployees into
Supervisors
The Board's decision in Oakwood Healthcare,Inc.10 3 was a highly
anticipated chapter in the ongoing chronicle of the Board's
characterization of certain kinds of professional employees as
"supervisors."' 04 As with the classification of certain workers as
96. Id. at 1305.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1310.
99. See, e.g., Jim McKay, NLRB: Employers Can Interrogate Nonunion Workers Without
Witness, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (June 18, 2004, 12:00 AM), http://www.postgazette.com/stories/business/news/nlrb-employers-can-interrogate-nonunion-workers-withoutwitness-540459/.
100. See, e.g., O'Brien, supra note 82, at 116 ("IBM represents a significant erosion of section
7 rights for non-union workers ... it precludes any guarantee of a modicum of due process prior to
the imposition of what may be unjust discipline . . .
101. Idatll-12.
102. IBMCorp.,341N.L.R.B.at 1310.
103. 348 N.L.R.B. 686 (2006).
104. Classification of a worker as a "supervisor" effectively places that individual beyond the
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"employees" discussed above, 0 5 the decision to identify workers as
"supervisors" is fraught with political implications because it strips those
workers of rights under the Act. 106
Because the Bush II Board frequently sharply contracted
protections for workers' rights by restricting the scope of these threshold
statutory definitions,'o0 the outcome in Oakwood was distressing, but it
was not surprising. Despite its admission that the Board is mandated
"not to construe supervisory status too broadly because the employee
who is deemed a supervisor is denied rights which the Act is intended to
protect," 08 the majority did just that. It interpreted the requirements for
identifying workers as statutory supervisors broadly and found that
registered nurses were "supervisors" because they had some authority to
assign work to others and exercise independent judgment.' 09
In a "stinging dissent,"o Liebman emphasized that the majority's
decision "threatens to create a new class of workers under Federal labor
law: workers who have neither the genuine prerogatives of management,
nor the statutory rights of ordinary employees.""' Her concerns were
rooted both in pragmatic evaluations of the potential reach of the
majority's decision and a desire to maintain fidelity to the Act's
legislative intent and history." 2 She explained the "gradations of
supervisory authority possible in a workplace and why the Board must
carefully take them 1 into
account, if it wants to be faithful to
3
Congressional intent."'
Despite initial concerns over the potentially devastating impact
Oakwood could conceivably have had on employees' rights under the
Act,114 commentators' fears have largely remained unsubstantiated. This
was partially due to the Board's decision in Network Dynamics Cabling,

protective ambit of the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 152(11) (2006).
105. See supra Part H.A.
106. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006).
107. See supra Part IIA.
108. Oakwood, 348 N.L.R.B. at 688 (quoting Chevron Shipping Co., 317 N.L.R.B. 379, 38081 (1995)).
109. Oakwood,348 N.L.R.B. at 698.
110. See Steven Greenhouse, Board Redefines Rulesfor Union Exemption, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/04/washington/041abor.html?pagewanted=all
4,
2006),[hereinafter, BoardRedefines Rules].
111. Oakwood, 348 N.L.R.B. at 700 (Member Liebman, dissenting).
112. See id. at 701-02.
113. Id. at 708.
114. See Greenhouse, BoardRedefines Rules, supranote 110 ("[L]abor experts predicted that
the ruling could affect more than eight million workers who might also be deemed supervisors.").
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Inc.,"' which curtailed the seemingly limitless scope of Oakwood.
While Liebman partially dissented in Oakwood, she joined the majority
in narrowing the Act's definition of "supervisors" in Network Dynamics
Cabling.116 This resolution of the underlying issue reflects her resilience
and willingness to question the anti-worker initiatives of the Bush II
Board.
E. AcceleratingProcesses: To Be, or Not To Be? - or, Dana Corp.
Blows a Gasket
In recent years, unions have increasingly relied on card check as a
recognition mechanism."' 7 This shift has been attributed to card check's
efficiency and unions' dissatisfaction with the seemingly endless process
of conducting Board elections.' 18 The Board's policies determining the
mechanics governing this process have become extremely
contentious." 9 In Dana Corp., the Board changed the recognition bar
doctrinel 2 0 by imposing a new requirement providing that no recognition
bar would exist after a grant of voluntary recognition "unless (a) affected
unit employees receive adequate notice of the recognition and of their
opportunity to file a Board election petition within 45 days, and (b) 45
days pass from the date of notice without the filing of a validlysupported petition."l 2 '
Liebman's dissent from the majority's modification of the
recognition bar doctrine reflected her concerns that unions' initial
collective bargaining efforts would be hamstrung by the specter of a
withdrawal of recognition.122 Because she recognized that the trend
away from Board elections was indicative of unions' disillusionment
with the Act and the Board's ability to robustly safeguard collective
115. 351 N.L.R.B. 1423 (2007).
116. Id. at 1425.
117. See Fisk & Malamud, supra note 18, at 2021("[U]nions have increasingly begun seeking
recognition based on a showing of signed union authorization cards ... rather than an election
supervised by the NLRB."). See also Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 444-45 (2007) (Member
Liebman, dissenting) ("[L]abor unions have increasingly turned away from the Board's election
process-frustrated with its delays and the opportunities it provides for employer coercion . . .
118. See Lofaso, supra note 17, at230.
119. See id.
120. This doctrine ensures that following designation as employees' bargaining representative,
a union will be afforded a reasonable amount of time to bargain and execute a collective bargaining
agreement. See Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. at 437 (quoting Keller Plastics E., Inc., 157 N.L.R.B.
583, 587 (1966)).

121.

Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. at441.

122.

See id at 444-45 (Member Liebman, dissenting).
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bargaining rights,12 3 her opinion emphasized the pragmatic
considerations served by the forty-year old recognition bar doctrine that
the majority discarded. Chief among those was Liebman's contention
that tampering with the recognition bar would seriously undermine
"prospects for industrial peace." 2 4
Because Liebman had spoken out publicly against the Board's
decision in Dana and was a very vocal dissenter, it did not surprise many
that, on the final day of her tenure as Chairman, the Board decided to
change course. In Lamons Gasket Co.,125 Liebman and the Board
majority decided to "overrule Dana and return to the previously wellestablished rule barring an election petition for a reasonable period of
time after voluntary recognition."12 6
The majority decision was rife with sharp critiques of Dana,noting
that, in addition to being a decision that was "flawed, factually, legally,
and as a matter of policy,"l27 it was also empirically deficient. The
Lamons Gasket majority noted that the Dana majority did not proffer
"any empirical evidence supporting the .. . suspicion that the showing of
majority support that must underlie any voluntary recognition is not
freely given or is otherwise invalid in a significant number of cases, or
that the existing statutory mechanisms for preventing coercion

. . .

are

28

Overruling Dana was a crucial component of Liebman's
inadequate."l
last days as Chair because the decision so clearly embodied the spirit of
what some dubbed the Bush II Board's "September Massacre" in
2007.129 To return to the state of the law prior to that wave of
aggressively pro-employer decisions was therefore a major symbolic
coup for Liebman and the Obama Board.13 0

123. See id. at 444. ("[T]oday's decision will surely enhance already serious disenchantment
with the Act's ability to protect the right of employees to engage in collective bargaining.").
124. Id. at 445.
125. 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 2011 WL 3916075 (Aug. 26, 2011).
126. Id.at*L.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.

129. See Lofaso, supra note 17, at 201.
130. Liebman enjoyed a similar victory with respect to the Board's so-called "merger bar
doctrine," reversing the arch-conservative decision in MV Transp., 337 N.L.R.B. 770 (2002), and
reinstating the Board's original doctrine. That doctrine was articulated in St. Elizabeth Manor, Inc.,
329 N.L.R.B. 341 (1999) and stands for the proposition that a union has a reasonable period of time
to remain unit bargaining representative to secure a contract with a successor employer after a
corporate merger. Id at 341. The Obama Board reversed MV Transp. in UGL-UNICCO Serv. Co.,
357 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 2011 WL 3916076 (Aug. 26, 2011).
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III. DISENCHANTMENT
In 2007, Liebman published an article in the Berkeley Journal of
Employment and Labor Law. 131 The article responded to the growing
dissatisfaction of legal commentators with the Board's decisions, which
she candidly characterized as increasingly formalistic attempts to narrow
the Act's coverage and cut back its protections. 132 She agreed that the
result of the Bush II Board's decisions had been intensified
disenchantment with the agency in general and acknowledged the Act's
shortcomings. 133
Liebman also noted that unions have become
"[i]ncreasingly disillusioned with the law's ability to protect worker
rights" 1 34 and lamented the apparently moribund spirit of New Deal
optimism that formed the basis for the Act in the first place.1 35 She
observed that "[w]hether labor is right or wrong about the Board makes
little difference. In this case, the perception of the law's failure is what
matters."136
Liebman then traced the development of the Act throughout its
history.137 She lauded its initial ability to help secure collective
bargaining rights for millions of Americans and credited it with the
creation of the American middle class.13 8 Liebman also critically
examined changing conditions at both the micro and macro levels that
undermined the efficacy of the Act. At the micro level, she specifically
pointed to the changing dynamics of the employment relationship and
the increased emphasis on contingent and temporary work, which is less
suited to organization and collective bargaining.139 In terms of the
macro level, Liebman described the massive geopolitical shifts that
characterized the 1980s and beyond and especially cited technology,
deregulation, the growth of the service sector and the decline of
manufacturing in the United States, immigration, and globalization as
trends that have thwarted efforts to harmonize the NLRA with
contemporary workers' needs.140

131. Wilma B. Liebman, Decline and Disenchantment: Reflections on the Aging of the
NationalLabor Relations Board,28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 569 (2007).
132. Id at 571.
133. See id. at 571-72.
134. Id. at 571.
135. Id. at 572. This statement nicely reflects the link between Liebman and Frances Perkins.
136. Id. at 571-72.
137. Id. at 572-74.
138. Id. at 572-73.
139. Id at 575.
140. Id at 574.
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Although Liebman acknowledged that the Act itself contains
limitations because of its statutory text and age and admitted that "even a
Board firmly committed to a dynamic application of the law would be
limited in what it could do," she insisted that the Bush II Board
substantially compounded this problem with its consistently crabbed
readings of the statute. 14 1 She argued that the Board in its current form
was "not only failing to maximize its available discretion," but also that
"its recent decisions [were] marginalizing statutory rights."l 42 Liebman
explained that the Bush II Board had a marked pattern of reflexively
overruling the key victories for workers earned by the Clinton Board and
discussed, inter alia, the controversial Dana and Oakwood decisions.14 3
Despite her frank appraisal of the shortcomings of the agency, the
tenor of Liebman's piece remained cautiously optimistic. 144 Liebman
firmly contended that "the Board, even under the current statutory
scheme, can play a modest but meaningful role in preserving the values
of this Act and in furthering its aims."1 45 She concluded that although
the spate of anti-worker decisions handed down by the Bush II Board
had obvious deleterious effects, they were generating increased public
discussion of labor law and workers' rights. 146
Liebman's article is interesting for several reasons. First, it
provides a snapshot of the historical and sociocultural circumstances
within which the Bush II Board was situated.147 It also helps explain her
frustration with the Bush II Board's trajectory and fleshes out many of
the arguments she made in her dissents. 14 8 Finally, it memorializes her
goals and visions for the future of the Act and how to adapt it to the
changing needs of American workers.14 9
IV. THE LEGACY OF CHAIRMAN LIEBMAN

On his first day in office, President Obama appointed Liebman the

141. Id.at576,580.
142. Id. at 580.
143. Id. at 580, 581 n.84, 582. For a thorough treatment of these cases, see supraPart II.D-E.
144. Liebman, supra note 131, at 572 ("There are reasons enough for disenchantment with
labor law, I readily acknowledge, but there are also grounds to reject despair.").
145.

Id.

146. Id. at 587-89 (highlighting the extensive news coverage of Oakwood and the resulting
segment on Comedy Central's The ColbertReport).
147. See id at 572.
148. See id at 571, 583.
149. See id at 589.
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Chairman of the Board.15 0 She was only the second woman to head the
Board in its history.15 ' And, just like Betty Murphy, Liebman insisted
on being addressed as the "Chairman" of the NLRB, because that is the
explicit terminology used by the statute.15
Liebman would serve as Chair for approximately thirty months,
resigning in August of 201 1.
Despite her short time leading the
Board, however, the agency published hundreds of decisions, some of
which served to scale back the vehemently pro-employer jurisprudence
of the past decade.15 4 Some of the Board's most notable decisions with
Liebman as Chair helped push American labor law into the twenty-first
century by recognizing the pervasive role of Internet technology in
workplace communication'5 and modem relationships between unions
and employers. 56
Other decisions demonstrated what would have been called
reasonable support for workers' rights in other decades, but in the years
since 2009 have been characterized as rabidly pro-union. 57 Political
opposition to workers' rights on the Board and in Washington had
swelled to a crescendo by the time Liebman stepped down, swirling
mainly around the Boeing controversy.ss Despite a sick economy and
the resulting panic, though, Liebman was able to show that the federal
government is capable of respecting workers' rights and forging fair law
towards that end.
This section will examine several of the Board's major
consequential decisions with Liebman as Chair. The aim is to show
their treatment of traditionally important topics, in order to contrast with
the Bush Board's policies and show the drastic shift to the center that the
Board effectuated in spite of its recent pro-employer stance.
150. Kimberly Atkins, Obama Makes Top Labor, Employment Bias Agency Picks, LAWYERS
USA (Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/lP2-19789678.html.
151. Betty Murphy served as the first woman Chairman in the seventies. See Board Members
Since 1935, NAT'L LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/board-members1935 (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
152. Wilma Liebman, Chairman, Address at St. John's University, School of Law (2010).
153. See ChairmanLiebman DepartsNLRB As Third Term Ends; Member Pearce Designated
New Chairman, NAT'L LAB. REL. BOARD (Aug. 27, 2011), http://www.nlrb.gov/news/chairmanliebman-departs-nlrb-third-term-ends-member-pearce-designated-new-chairman.
154. See, e.g., discussion supraPart I.E.
155. See, e.g., J&R Flooring, Inc., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 9, 2010 WL 4318372 (Oct. 22, 2010);
Tex. Dental Ass'n, 354 N.L.R.B. No. 57, 2009 WL 2340684 (July 29, 2009).
156. See, e.g., DanaCorp., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 49,2010 WL 4963202 (Dec. 6,2010).
157. See Sam Hananel, Labor Board Flexes Muscle for Unions, To Chagrinof Republicans,
Business
Groups,
STARTRIBUNE.COM
(Feb.
9,
2011),
http://www.startribune.com/templates/Print-ThisStory?sid=1 15661969.
158. See Greenhouse, BoardDrops Case Against Boeing, supra note 5.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol30/iss1/3

18

Gregory et al.: The Labor Law Jurisprudence of Wilma Liebman

2012]

WILMA LIEBMAN

45

A. New Process Steel
In understanding the narrative of Liebman's role as leader of the
NLRB, it is important to note the 2010 Supreme Court decision in New
Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB.' 59 In that case, the Court ruled that the
Board could not make binding decisions without a three-person quorum
sitting, invalidating hundreds of decisions that Liebman issued as
Chair.160
From January 2008 until March 2010, the Board's membership fell
to two members.16 ' Before Members Kirsanow and Walsh left the
Board, the four members delegated their quorum authority to Members
Liebman and Schaumber once the others' terms expired.162 Once
Liebman and Schaumber remained, the two issued nearly 600 opinions
under that authority over the course of 27 months.1 6 3 One of those
decisions concerned unfair labor practices ("ULPs") against New
Process Steel. The company challenged the Board's authority to make
decisions with only two members, and the case made its way to the
Supreme Court to decide the issue of whether the Board had the
authority to delegate power to the two-member panel.' 64
The Court found that the Board did not have quorum power with
only two members, even if a three-member quorum authorized such
power.'6 5 The majority opinion relied on the Taft-Hartley Act's change
to a five-member Board and its requirement of a three-member
quorum.'66 While the Board had interpreted Taft-Hartley to allow a
three-member quorum to authorize two members of that quorum to
continue acting with full authority once one of the three left the Board,
the Court interpreted the statute to require the Board to maintain a threemember quorum in order to exercise its authority. 6 7 Taft-Hartley's
amendments to the NLRA require that three members of the Board
159. 130 S. Ct. 2635 (2010).
160. See id at 2645.
161. Id at 2639.
162. See id. at 2638.
163. Id at 2639.
164. Id
165. See id. at 2645.
166. Id. at 2638, 2645. See also 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (2006) ("The Board is authorized to
delegate to any group of three or more members any or all of the powers which it may itself
exercise. . . . A vacancy in the Board shall not impair the right of the remaining members to exercise
all of the powers of the Board, and three members of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a
quorum of the Board, except that two members shall constitute a quorum of any group designated
pursuant to the first sentence hereof.").
167. New ProcessSteel, 130 S. Ct. at 2640.
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participate "at all times."l 68 To allow two members to act with the full
authority of the Board would undermine the statute's requirement of
three members. 169 Given that Taft-Hartley did not explicitly authorize
two members to act as a quorum, as Liebman and Schaumber had been
acting, it would have been improper to read such an allowance into the
statute's language. 170 Finally, the Court relied on the fact that the Board
had only allowed two members to act with full authority in rare cases
where one member of a three-member quorum had been excused.' 7 '
Other considerations, such as the value of allowing the Board to function
with only two members for efficiency's sake, did not outweigh the
Court's decision that Taft-Hartley had set a clear requirement of three

members.17 2
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Sotomayor, wrote a dissenting opinion, arguing that the Court's holding
conflicted with the underlying purposes of the NLRA and preferred one
reading
of Taft-Hartley's
language
among
several
valid
interpretations. 73 The dissent argued that the statute's plain language
allowed the Board to issue two-member decisions, meaning the Court's
decision deprived the Board of its statutory right to function with two
members.174 Justice Kennedy argued that, given that the statute allowed
the Board to issue decisions by two members, the agency should be
afforded that right in order to further the NLRA's fundamental goal of
promoting industrial peace in interstate commerce. 75
Instead of
promoting that value, the majority's interpretation of Taft-Hartley's
requirement "leave[s] the Board defunct for extended periods of time, a
result that Congress surely did not intend."' 7 6
The Supreme Court's holding rendered the over five hundred
decisions made while the Board consisted of only Liebman and
Schaumber invalid and established the rule that the Board has no
decision-making authority without at least a three-member quorum.177
Of the cases discussed below, only Cintas Corp.'78 and Texas Dental

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id.
Id at 2640-41.
Id. at 2641.
See id
See id at 2644.
See id at 2645 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2646.
Id. at 2645 (citing NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 257 (1939)).
New Process Steel, 130 S. Ct. at 2652.
Id. at 2645.
353 N.L.R.B. 752 (2009).
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Ass'nl 79 were decided under the two-member Board. Regardless of their
procedural flaws, the cases decided by Liebman and Schaumber
illustrate the perseverance of the NLRB with Liebman as chair, as well
as Liebman's dedication to the cause of workers' rights.

B. Cintas and Jurys Boston Hotel - EnforcingEmployer Rules During
Elections
In Cintas Corp., the Board addressed the perennial issue of
workers' right to display pro-union material during an organizing
campaign. so Employees at Cintas facilities in Charlotte, North Carolina
and Brandford, Connecticut received warnings from management for
wearing hats with UNITE HERE insignia and displaying union stickers
and flyers at work."s' When workers wore union hats and stickers at
work, the employer told them that doing so violated company policy and
warned them that they could be disciplined. 182 When workers had worn
non-union hats and adornments in the past, the employer had simply
asked them to remove them, without reference to formal discipline.'8 3
When an employee displayed a union flyer at her workstation, she was
told to remove it and not show it to anyone.184 The employer also
confiscated union flyers from the employee break room.8 5
Cintas was one of the first decisions Liebman faced as Chair of the
Board, and it provided her with the opportunity to demonstrate the
Obama Board's evaluation of disparate treatment cases in the wake of
186
Although Register-Guard had given employers
Register-Guard.
much leeway in applying policies while avoiding charges of unlawful
discrimination, 187 the Board found that the employer's behavior with
respect to the union hats, stickers, and fliers was not
Whereas the employer had merely told
"nondiscriminatory."
employees wearing hats not related to unionization to remove them (or,
in the case of head scarves, permitted them), it gave warnings to
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

354 N.L.R.B. No. 57, 2009 WL 2340684 (July 29, 2009).
Cintas Corp., 353 N.L.R.B. at 752.
See id. at 752, 766.
Id. at 752-53.
Id. at 752.
Id. at 753.
Id.
See supra Part H.B.
See Guard Publ'g Co. (Register-Guard1), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1114 (2007).
Cintas Corp., 353 N.L.R.B. at 752.
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employees who wore union hats. 189 Similarly, the company had allowed
employees to keep various personal belongings in their work areas, but
verbally warned one worker for placing a union hat in hers, implying
that failure to remove it would lead to her discharge. 90 Such uneven
treatment of union materials was "disparate treatment of activities or
communications of a similar character because of their union or other
Section 7-protected status" under Register-Guard.19' The Board thus
found NLRA Section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) violations for the warnings.19 2
Cintas' reaction to the presence of union flyers in the workplace
was also discriminatory. 9 3 The employer ordered a worker to put a
union flyer away, later claiming that displaying the flyer violated a nodistribution policy.194 The Board found that the supervisor who warned
the employee did not tell her that she had violated the policy, and that
the worker could not have reasonably understood that the warning was
because of such policy.195 This action and the employer's confiscation of
union fliers from the employee break room constituted 8(a)(1)
violations.' 96
Jurys Boston Hotel'97 is an example of the Board's increased
intolerance for rules that could interfere with workers' Section 7 rights,
even when the employer acts much more amicably than in Cintas. In
that case, the employer hotel had maintained a cooperative relationship
with the union, instructing supervisors to display a "neutral if not
positive" attitude towards the union during an election period.' 98
However, the employer's handbook had several requirements to which
the union objected during the election period, including rules against
solicitation on the employer's property, loitering outside the hotel
without permission, and "'wear[ing] emblems, badges or buttons with
messages of any kind other than the issued nametags or other official
types of pins . . . .""99 After the union had filed ULPs related to these

rules and before the election, the employer sent a memo to workers
stating that the rules were not meant to abridge their rights under the

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id.
Id. at 752-53.
Register-Guardl, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1118.
Cintas Corp., 353 N.L.R.B. at 752.
See id. at 753.
Id
Id.
Id.
356 N.L.R.B. No. 114,2011 WL 1127474 (Mar. 28,2011).
Jurys Bos. Hotel, 2011 WL 1127474, at *1.
Id. at * 1-2 (alteration in original).
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NLRA and that the paragraph about wearing paraphernalia should be
deleted from the handbook.20 0 In addition to the memo, the rules were
not enforced against any workers during the election. 20 1 The union lost
the subsequent election by one vote out of ninety-three.20 2
The Board held that the mere existence of the rules during the
election was enough to set aside the election result, since the rules could
reasonably be said to have affected the outcome of the election.20 3 In
coming to this conclusion, the Board relied on the fact that the three
rules, taken together or individually, could be seen as a constraint of
employees' Section 7 rights from the workers' standpoint.204 Unlike in
previous similar cases where the employer maintained a single
objectionable rule,205 the hotel's several rules could have presented
workers with the impression that they were not allowed to speak to their
co-workers about supporting the union or to express their support in
other ways.206 The Board was further convinced that the election should
be set aside because of the very narrow margin by which the union lost
the election.207 Although the employer had been cooperative with the
union previously and had taken the step of informing employees that
their rights should not be considered constrained under the rules, the
Board was not convinced that the objectionable rules had no possible
effect on the election result, and it thus ordered a second election.208
Cintas and Jurys Boston Hotel show the stance that the Board under
Liebman took towards the existence and application of rules that could
affect workers' Section 7 rights during the crucial period leading up to
an election. Such cases presumably put employers on notice that they
should err on the side of accommodating workers' right to organize.
These decisions also signaled to the labor law world that the Bush
Board's stance towards workers' rights was being reversed.

200. Id. at *2.
201. Id.
202. Id. at *4.
203. Id. at *3.
204. See id.
205. See, e.g., Delta Brands, Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. 252 (2005) (restriction of workplace
solicitation); Safeway, Inc., 338 N.L.R.B. 525 (2002) (confidentiality rule).
206. Jurys Boston Hotel, 2011 WL 1127474, at *3.
207. Id. at *4.
208. Id. at *5.
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C. Texas Dental Association / Terry Machine-Tenuous Territoryfor
Supervisors
Texas Dental Ass 'n,209 also decided early in Liebman's service as
Chair, addressed the issues of a supervisor's limited protection under the
Act and unorganized employees' Section 7 rights when they are not
actively unionizing. 210 Because the Board consisted of only two
members at the time, Liebman and Schaumber did not rule on the issue
of what notice an employer is obligated to provide when it violates the
Act.211 However, Liebman noted that she would have held that the
employer was obligated to give notice electronically, since that was how
the employer normally communicated with employees.212
Workers at Texas Dental met several times, discussing their
dissatisfaction with some of the employer's policies.213 They drafted a
petition to send to the employer.2 14 Out of fear of reprisal, the
employees took several steps to ensure their anonymity, including
meeting away from work and signing the petition with aliases.215
Barbara Lockerman, a supervisor, went to part of the second meeting.216
Later, the company's President warned Lockerman and other staff
members that the employees involved could be fired and added that her
job was in danger.2 17 A member of management soon broadcasted to
employees that anyone involved in the meetings had to report to her.218
Lockerman refused to tell management the identities of the employees
involved, and she was soon fired for her lack of cooperation.2 19
Although supervisors are normally not directly protected by the
Act, there is some protection for supervisors who refuse to further an
employer's ULP. 2 20 The Board reviewed this precedent, emphasizing
209. 354 N.L.R.B. No. 57, 2009 WL 2340684 (July 29, 2009).
210. See Tex. DentalAss'n, 2009 WL 2340684, at *1, *2.
211. See id. at *1 n.4. While the Board adopted the administrative law judge's
recommendation that the violations of the Respondent should be posted in the workplace, the Board
never ruled that such an action would be the standard for similar cases. See id. at *5, *22.
212. Id. at *I n.4. This issue would be revisited once the Board had a recognized quorum in
J&R Flooring,356 N.L.R.B. No. 9, 2010 WL 4318372 (Oct. 22, 2010).
213. See Tex. Dental, 2009 WL 2340684, at *1.
214. Id.
215. Id. at *3 n.11.
216. See id. at *1.
217. Id. at *3.
218. Id. at *2.
219. Id. ("Although Linn[Lockerman's superior] offered other explanations for the discharge,
the judge properly found that the sole reason for the Respondent's action was her failure to divulge
to Linn what Lockerman knew of the employees' protected concerted activities.").
220. See id. See also Parker-Robb Chevrolet, 262 N.L.R.B. 402, 403 (1982); Talladega Cotton

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol30/iss1/3

24

Gregory et al.: The Labor Law Jurisprudence of Wilma Liebman

2012]

WILMA LIEBMAN

51

that, under the Act, employers cannot fire supervisors for failure to
unlawfully prevent organizing.221 The employees' meetings and petition
were protected activity under the Act.222
The Board compared
Lockerman's case to HowardJohnson Motor Lodge,2 23 where the Board
had held that a supervisor was illegally fired for failing to give the
employer names of employees who had attended a union meeting.224
Relying on the company's warnings to Lockerman, its demand for
information about the meetings, and other evidence of the employer's
hunt for the names of organizing workers,225 the Board held that
Lockerman's discharge was an 8(a)(1) violation.226
The Board added that, since the employer conceded that it fired the
supervisor for her failure to divulge information, no Wright Line analysis
was necessary to determine the legality of the employer's motive.22 7
Even if it were, though, it was clear that the employer's motivation in
firing the manager - a campaign to flush out organizing employees was illegal under Wright Line.22 8 Because the discharge was aimed at
ending concerted activity, the illegal discharge had an inherent adverse
influence on employees' Section 7 rights, even if the employees had not
known of it. 229
In Terry Machine,230 another case dealing with supervisor support
for organizing activity, the Board held that pro-union supervisors who
influence employees during a unionization campaign do not necessarily
violate employee free choice. 23 1 In its supplemental decision to a 2006
case, 2 32 the Board analyzed the activity of seven supervisors who bad

Factory, 106 N.L.R.B. 295, 319 (1953).
221. See Tex. Dental, 2009 WL 2340684, at *2.
222. See id. at *1.
223. 261 N.L.R.B. 866 (1982).
224. Id. at 870-71; Tex. Dental,2009 WL 2340684, at *2.
225. Tex. Dental, 2009 WL 2340684, at *3 ("We find, based on (1) the warnings of May and
Haufler to Lockerman, (2) [the employer's] demand that employees, as a condition of employment,
report their participation in the anonymous activity, (3) the computer forensic investigation, and (4)
Clark's termination after that investigation revealed evidence of his involvement, that the
Respondent had embarked on an effort to identify participants in order to terminate them for
exercising their rights under the Act.").
226. Id.
227. See Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980); Tex. Dental, 2009 WL 2340684,
at *4.
228. Tex. Dental,2009 WL 2340684, at *4.
229. Id at *4. See also Parker-Robb Cevrolet, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 402, 404 (1982).
230. 356 N.L.R.B. No. 120, 2011 WL 1127481 (Mar. 28, 2011).
231. See id.
at*1,*3.
232. See Terry Mach. Co., 348 N.L.R.B. 919 (2006).
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solicited employees for signatures on a showing-of-interest petition.2 33
The supervisors had each solicited between three and twenty employees
over the course of one or two days.234 Meanwhile, the employer
engaged in an aggressive anti-union campaign, which included captive
audience meetings, one-on-one meetings, and letters to employees'
homes. 2 35
The employer also threatened to fire the pro-union
supervisors, and most employees soon learned of the threat.2 36
The Board applied the two-prong standard from Harborside
Healthcare,Inc. ,237 which held that pro-union supervisory conduct was a
violation of the Act when the activity tended to interfere with employee
free choice to the extent that it materially impacted the election's
result.238 The Board held that any potential influence the supervisors'
activity had on employees' choice was mitigated by the employer's
intense anti-union campaign.239 In particular, employees' knowledge of
the threat to fire the supervisors cancelled out any compulsion they
might have felt to follow those supervisors' preferences. 2 40 Thus, the
supervisors did not violate the Act and the employer's objections to the
election based on their activity were overruled.24 1
D. Stella D'oro Biscuit
The Board focused on a party's duty to provide financial documents
during bargaining in Stella D'oro Biscuit Co. 24 2 The case also touched
on employers' obligations when they have been temporarily bought by
private equity firms, an increasingly popular practice in the modem
business world.2 43
While Stella D'oro was negotiating a new contract with the union,
it referred several times to its financial health, as well as that of
Brynwood, the private equity firm that owned it. 244 The company
claimed that it would not be able to survive if it did not get concessions

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Terry Mach., 2011 WL 1127481, at *2.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id
343 N.L.R.B. 906, 909 (2004).
Terry Mach., 2011 WL 1127481, at *4. See also Harborside,343 N.L.R.B. at 911.
See Terry Mach., 2011 WL 1127481, at *5.
Id. at *4-5.
See id.
355 N.L.R.B. No. 158, 2010 WL 3446122, at *6-8 (Aug. 27, 2010).
See id at *1.
See id. at *1-2, *5.
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from the union, since Brynwood conditioned its continued support of
Stella on those concessions.245 When the union asked for proof of the
company's financial status, the employer gave the union a one-page
It also let the union see a full nineteen-page financial audit
summary.
at a bargaining session, but refused to let the union photocopy it. 24 7
When the union brought JLP charges against the company for Stella's
refusal to present the document, the employer claimed it had only
expressed an unwillingness to bargain, not an inability to pay for labor
costs. 248
Before holding that the employer violated 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) for its
refusal to furnish financial information, the Board reviewed a history of
cases that said an employer must provide full financial documents when
it claims an inability to pay the union during bargaining. 249 The Board
found that Stella made statements that amounted to saying that the
company's existence was contingent on getting concessions, 2 50 despite
statements about Brynwood's willingness to take on short-term
economic losses. 251' Although Brynwood was willing to provide money
to Stella, the majority framed the issue as Stella's ability to pay, not its
parent company.2 52 Stella's statements about its inability to pay triggered
an obligation to give the union the requested financial proof.253
The company's sole given reason for failing to allow the union to
photocopy the full audit was the fear that the information's
The Board, however,
confidentiality would be compromised.254
debunked this as pretextual, since the union was willing to sign a
confidentiality agreement regarding what it read in the audit.255 Given
245. See id at *2.
246. Id.
247. Id
248. See id at *5.
249. See id at *5-6. See also Lakeland Bus Lines, Inc., 335 N.L.R.B. 322, 322 (2001);
Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 1069, 1080 (1995); Shell Co., 313 N.L.R.B. 133, 133

(1993).
250. StellaD'oro,2010 WL 3446122, at *5.
251. Id.
252. Id (citing Sioux City Stockyards (United Stockyards Corp.), 293 N.L.R.B. 1, 2 (1989)).
Member Schaumber dissented, arguing that Stella D'oro did not claim an inability to pay. See
Stella D'oro, 2010 WL 3446122, at *14. Schaumber interpreted the company's statements as a
declaration that it was able to pay for requested wages and benefits, but that Brynwood's
expectation of future profitability made Stella unwilling to pay for the increases. See id. at *14-15.
Because Brynwood had made clear that it was willing to invest in the company as a temporary loss,
it was inaccurate to say that the employer had claimed a total inability to pay. See id
253. Id. at *6.
254. Id. at *8.
255. Id
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the lack of justification for the company's refusal, the Board found that
Stella violated its duty to provide the information by refusing to allow
the union to photocopy the document.256 The majority, following
American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,257 relied on "the volume and
nature of the information; whether furnishing a photocopy would give
greater assurance of accuracy and completeness; and the comparative
cost and convenience to both parties of providing the photocopy." 25 8 It
found that all three factors favored the union's position. 25 9
E. Dana Corp. (2010) - EncouragingCooperativeRelationships
The Board addressed the legality of the now common practice of
employers and unions making preliminary agreements to cooperate
during organizing in Dana Corp.260 The United Automobile, Aerospace,
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) and Dana had
entered a Letter of Agreement (LOA) in which they set rules for future
organizing of Dana facilities by the UAW.261 The LOA stated that
during an organizing campaign the employer would remain neutral, the
union would receive employee names and addresses, and there would be
no strike or lockout.262 The LOA also said that the parties would bargain
once there was a showing of majority support for the labor contract,
which would include several substantive terms, including healthcare
costs, minimum classifications, and mandatory overtime.263 After the
parties signed the LOA, Dana announced to employees that it had
created a neutrality agreement with the union.264 Afterwards, three Dana
employees filed ULP charges against the parties, alleging that Dana had
violated Section 8(a)(2) and (1) and the UAW had restrained employee

256. Id. Member Schaumber dissented on the Board's second point as well, arguing that the
nature of the document in the case made the employer's proposal to review the document at its
offices a sufficient offering of information. See id. at *16. The financial statement, according to
Schaumber, was "not a detailed, complex document, especially for an attorney or accountant
familiar with financial statements." Id Beyond that, visiting the employer's office to review the
document would not have presented a substantial burden to the union. Id. Thus, the employer's
office satisfied the requirements of information offers under Board precedent. Id.
257. 250 N.L.R.B. 47 (1980).
258. Stella D'oro, 2010 WL 3446122, at *6 (citing Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 250 N.L.R.B. at 54).
259. See id
260. 356 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 2010 WL 4963202, at *1 (Dec. 6, 2010).
261. See id.
at*1-2.
262. Id. at *2.
263. Id.at *2-3.
264. Id. at *3.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol30/iss1/3

28

Gregory et al.: The Labor Law Jurisprudence of Wilma Liebman

2012]

WILMA LIEBMAN

55

free choice in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A). 265
The Board held that the employer had not violated the Act by
signing the LOA, and it did not discuss the charge against the union.26 6
The majority opinion began its discussion by noting that the primary
purpose of Section 8(a)(2) was to stop company-dominated unions,
which had been a popular way of suppressing worker power when the
NLRA was enacted.267 Such company unions have been rightly
regarded as antithetical to meaningful collective bargaining.268
However, the Board emphasized that the Act allows some degree of
cooperation between employers and unions.26 9 Parties can create
"members-only" agreements, indicate that they wish to enter into a
bargaining relationship once majority support is established, and agree to
voluntary recognition through card check. 2 70 Employers that have
multiple facilities, such as Dana in this case, can also agree to future
recognition of the -union at other sites when they bargain for a labor
contract.271
In coming to its conclusion, the Board's opinion drew distinctions
between this case and precedent in Bernhard-Altmann27 2 and Majestic
Weaving Co.,273 both of which had put restrictions on cooperation
between employers and unions. 274 In Bernhard-Altmann, the Supreme
Court held that an employer violated section 8(a)(2) when it recognized
a minority union as the exclusive bargaining representative and agreed to
end a strike, and detailed certain terms over which the parties would
bargain. 2 75 Three years later in Majestic Weaving, the Board relied on
the Court's decision to hold that the employer violated 8(a)(2) under
similar facts.276 In that case, the employer had negotiated a full
collective bargaining agreement before the union had shown majority
support.277 After the collective bargaining agreement was completed,
the union presented authorization cards from a majority of the
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
(1961).
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Id.
See id. at *12.
See id. at *5.
See id. at *6.
Id.
See id.
Id. (citing Hous. Div. of the Kroger Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 388, 388-89 (1975)).
Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB (Bernhard-Altmann), 366 U.S. 731
147 N.L.R.B. 859 (1964).
See Bernhard-Altmann, 366 U.S. at 739; Majestic Weaving, 147 N.L.R.B. at 862.
Bernhard-Altmann,366 U.S. at 732-34.
See Majestic Weaving, 147 N.L.R.B. at 860.
See id.
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bargaining unit, some of which had been solicited by a supervisor.278
The Board distinguished these cases from Dana by pointing out
that Dana Corp. had not granted the UAW exclusive recognition, the
parties had not bargained a collective bargaining agreement, and there
was no solicitation of authorization cards by a supervisor.279 Rather,
"the LOA did no more than create a framework for future collective
bargaining, if (as specified in the agreement) the UAW were first able to
provide proof of majority status ... 280 In fact, the LOA explicitly
stated that the union did not have majority status, and likewise did not
recognize the union as exclusive bargaining representative. 281 The
Board's opinion went on to say that such an agreement was unlikely to
pressure workers into supporting the union and that, in this case, the
bargaining unit actually voted not to support the union.282 The Board
reasoned that prohibiting agreements like the LOA would undermine the
NLRA's foundational goal of promoting industrial peace by facilitating
Collaborative steps like
cooperation between unions and employers.
card check and neutrality agreements have strengthened peaceful and
productive relationships between unions and businesses in past
decades.284 Prohibiting such cooperation would, rather than promote the
goals of section 8(a)(2), weaken the means by which parties can forge
healthy long-term relationships. 8 5 Therefore, relying on the distinctions
between Majestic Weaving and this case and the force of the policy of
promoting fruitful industrial relations, the Board dismissed the claims
against the employer.2 86
Dana is another example of steps the Liebman-led majority took to
bring Board law in synch with the realities of the twenty-first century.
The majority noted the increasingly important role of neutrality
agreements in successful and peaceful organizing, 287 implicitly
recognizing the non-zero-sum nature of the relationships between unions
and employers. Although the Board declined to state a definitive rule
288
governing such agreements, Dana's strong language made clear that

278.
279.

See id.at 859-60.
Dana Corp., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 2010 WL 4963202, at *8 (Dec. 6, 2010)

280.

Id.

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

See id
See id at*12.
Seeid.at*10.
See id
See id
See id at *8, *12.
at*10.
See id.
Seeid.at*11.
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such cooperative measures should be encouraged as a logical extension
of the NLRA's purpose. 289
F. Jackson Hospital Corp. / The Humane Society for Seattle
Given the vitriol aimed at the Board, and particularly at Liebman as
she retired from her position as chair, 290 it is worthwhile to note some
specific examples of the Board's evenhanded application of labor law.
In Jackson Hospital Corp.,291 the Board held that one employee,
Gross, had been justly fired by the employer, while another, Combs, had
been illegally fired for union support.292 Gross had failed to carry out a
necessary part of the detailed procedure for blood transfusions, resulting
29
in a transfusion going to the wrong patient.29
Although the employer
was aware of the worker's past union support, the Board's Wright Line
analysis concluded that Gross had been discharged for a
nondiscriminatory reason. 294
By contrast, another employee at the hospital, Combs, was found to
have been discharged for her union support, with the employer's stated
reason being a pretext.295 After Combs asserted her Weingarten right to
union representation at a meeting with management, the employer
Whereas similar
placed her on an investigatory suspension. 296
suspensions had normally lasted no more than two weeks, Combs's
lasted for over a year.297 Based on the circumstances of the suspension,
the Board found that the employer had violated sections 8(a)(1) and

8(a)(3).298

The Humane Society for Seattle/King County299 addressed the
application of Board precedent when there is confusion about whom the
employees voted for in a Board election. 3 00 The majority, including
Liebman, concluded that an election had to be overturned because the

289. See id at *9-10.
290. See Greenhouse, BoardDrops Case Against Boeing,supra note 5.
291. 355 N.L.R.B. No. 129, 2010 WL 3421928 (Aug. 27, 2010), enforcement denied by,
Jackson Hosp. Corp. v. NLRB, 647 F.3d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
292. Jackson Hosp., 2010 WL 3421928, at *1.
293. See id at *2-3.
294. See id at *3.
295. See id. at *6.
296. See id. at *5.
297. See id at *6 n.11.
298. Id. at *7.
299. 356 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 2010 WL 4474381 (Oct. 28, 2010).
300. See id. at *5.
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kind of confusion that had been created was partially the union's fault.30 1
The Animal Control Officers Guild (ACOG) won an election by
one vote, with the employer challenging two votes on the grounds that
the union had made material misrepresentations about what a "yes" vote
meant.30 2
Before the election, some employees were under the
impression that they were voting for their own independent union, rather
than for a bargaining unit affiliated with ACOG.303 The Board reviewed
relevant precedent, showing that in some cases similar confusion was
not strong enough to overturn an election. 304 However, the Board held
305
that Pacific Southwest Container,
where the Board overturned an
election where employees were misinformed about the identity of the
union they voted for, was controlling.306 The Board relied on the
apparent confusion among employees, the closeness of the vote, and the
fact that ACOG had been responsible for some of the confusion, and
ordered the election overturned.30 7
In both Jackson Hospital and The Humane Society, the Board ruled
against the unions and union members involved.30 s Rather than simply
affirming the administrative law judges' decisions, Liebman's Board
applied precedent fairly and changed the decision below to square with
reality. Although this analysis cannot examine every mundane decision
the Board made while Liebman was chair, it is important to notice that
Liebman took her role as impartial decision-maker seriously, despite her
obvious pro-union stance. 3 09 Recent criticism has painted the Board as a
left-wing sect of an overbearing government,3 10 when in fact the agency
has applied precedent that furthers the purposes of the NLRA evenly.

301. Id. at *6.
302. Id. at *4.
303. See id. at *1, *7.
304. See id. at *5 (citing Nev. Sec. Innovations, 337 N.L.R.B. 1108 (2002)).
305. 283 N.L.R.B. 79 (1987).
306. See Humane Society, 2010 WL 4474381, at *5, *6.
307. See id. at *6.
308. See Jackson Hosp. Corp., 355 N.L.R.B. No. 129, 2010 WL 3421928, at *1, *3 (Aug. 27,
2010); Humane Society, 2010 WL 4474381, at *1, *3.
309. See Flynn, supra note 14, at 1412.
310. See Benjy Sarlin, After Appeal from Nikki Haley, Newt Gingrich Jumps into SC
Boeing/Labor
Fight,
TPM
(May
11,
2011,
9:58
AM),
http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2011/05/after-appeal-from-nikki-haley-newt-gingrich-jumpsinto-sc-boeinglabor-fight.php; Carter Wood, Criticisms Mount Against NLRB's Attack Against
Boeing,
Business,
SHOPFLOOR
(Apr.
21,
2011
4:57
PM),
http://www.shopfloor.org/2011/04/criticisms-mount-against-nlrbs-attack-against-boeingbusiness/20153.
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G. J&R Flooring 's Wake Up Call to Register-Guard
Attempting to make up for the Board's past status as "the 'Rip Van
Winkle of administrative agencies[,]"' 31 1 J&R Flooring,Inc.3 12 stands as
an example of Liebman's determination to guide the agency into the
twenty-first century. The holding applied existing Board jurisprudence
to the realities of the modern working life, including employees' reliance
on electronic communication and the decentralization of the
workplace. 1
In introducing the case, the majority alluded to
Weingarten's statement that the Board, as an administrative agency,
should adapt the Act to changes in industrial life.3 14
In a supplemental decision to a case decided several months earlier
where the employer had violated the Act by failing to recognize
employees through card check, 1 5 the Board held that the employer's
duty to give notice of its violation carried an obligation to post that
notice electronically. 316 Relying on the Board's section 10(c) power to
order a party to give notice of a ULP it has committed,317 the majority
applied existing doctrine to hold that this duty obliges an employer that
normally communicates with workers electronically to post notice of a
ULP through the same means.3 18
The Board's precedent said that employers must post notice of
rights violations in order to counteract the damage done by ULPs, to
inform employees of their rights and what steps should be taken, and to
deter future violations by the employer. 31 9 To make sure these goals are
met, postings must usually be made for sixty days in a conspicuous place
where other notices are usually posted. 32 0 However, the Board stated
that paper notice had in some cases become outdated, given modem
communication's reliance on electronic means. 321
As electronic
communication increases in ubiquity, the Board reasoned, paper notice
311. Guard Publ'g Co. (Register-Guard 1), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1121 (2007) (Members
Liebman and Walsh, dissenting) (quoting NLRB v. Thill, Inc., 980 F.2d 1137, 1142 (7th Cir.
1992)).
312. 356 N.L.R.B. No. 9,2010 WL 4318372 (Oct. 22, 2010).
313. J&R Flooring,2010 WL 4318372, at *1, *3.
314. Id. at *1.
315. See J&R Flooring, Inc., 355 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 2010 WL 3385367, at *1 (Aug. 26, 2010).
316. J&R Flooring, 2010 WL 4318372, at *3.
317. See Pa. Greyhound Lines, Inc., I N.L.R.B. 1, 50, 52 (1935); Teamsters Local 115 v.
NLRB, 640 F.2d 392, 399-401 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
318. J&R Flooring, 2010 WL 4318372, at *1, *3.
319. Id. at *2 (citing Teamsters Local 115, 640 F.2d at 399-401).
320.

J&R Flooring, 20 10 WL 4318372, at *2.

321.

Id. at*3.
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will be less likely to reach employees.322 The increasing decentralization
of the workplace, created by employees' increasing ability to do work
from home, presents a similar problem with paper notices posted at the
employer's facility.323 The Board's holding that employers should post
notice electronically if it is the customary means of communication
foreclosed the argument that such notice would be a burden, since
obligated employers would already have the ability to send such
messages.3 24
In its explanation of the holding, the Board stressed that it was not
broadening the posting requirement, but merely applying the existing
standard that required posting notice in a conspicuous place. 325 The
decision shows the Board's willingness to adapt federal labor law to the
realities of modem technology. Such decisions, as well as the
subsequent Board rule that all private employers post section 7 rights, 32 6
show the agency's commitment to the purposes of the NLRA, one of
which is to make workers aware of their right to act collectively and
enforce their statutory rights.327
H. Eliason & Knuth of Arizona and Sheet Metal Workers International
In Eliason & Knuth of Arizona,32 8 the Board dealt with the novel
question of the legality of a union displaying a banner outside a
secondary employer during a labor dispute. 3 29 The majority, including
Liebman, held that a union does not violate section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) when
its representatives hold a stationary banner outside a secondary employer
while unobtrusively distributing fliers to passersby.330
While the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America was in a primary dispute with four construction employers, ' it
322. Id. (citing Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The NationalLabor Relations Act in
Cyberspace: Union Organizingin Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000)).
323. See J&R Flooring,2010 WL 4318372, at *3.
324. See id.
325. Id at *4; Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150, 352 N.L.R.B. 360, 361 (2008). See
also Ferguson Electric Co., 335 N.L.R.B. 142, 142 n.3 (2001) (treating electronic communications
the same as traditional paper records for purposes of the Act); Bryant & Stratton Bus. Inst., 327
N.L.R.B. 1135, 1135 n.3 (1999) (findings similar to Ferguson).
326. See discussion infra Part V.
327. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
328. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., Local Union No. 1506 (Eliason & Knuth
ofAriz.), 355 NLRB No. 159, 2010 WL 3452309 (Aug. 27, 2010).
329. Eliason & Knuth, 2010 WL 3452309, at *1.

330.

Seeid.at*1.

331.

Idat*2.
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regularly sent representatives to hold large banners saying "SHAME ON
[employer]" near the entrance of three secondary employers and gave
out literature describing the main labor dispute in detail.3 32 The three or
four protesters present did not block the sidewalk or entrance to the
buildings.
They also did not chant or yell, choosing only to engage
people near them by handing out fliers.334 The employers filed charges
against the union under section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act.
The Board analyzed the text, legislative history, cases, and
underlying policies of 8(b)(4)(ii)(B),33 6 concluding that the provision
does not prohibit the union's activity against secondary employers in this
case. 3 37 The section states that it is a ULP for a union to "threaten,
coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry
affecting commerce" with the aim of forcing parties to stop doing
business. 338 The Board concentrated on the "threaten, coerce, or
restrain" language, as it is the source of case law on point, concluding
that holding a stationary banner without blocking the movement of
people passing by does not fall within the plain meaning of the three
verbs.339
In looking at the legislative history behind the provision, the Board
drew from the Supreme Court case of Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.
Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council,340 where
the Court had examined the legislative intent behind the NLRA's
restrictions on secondary boycotts, including picketing. 3 4 1 The Act was
not meant to ban all activity associated with secondary boycotts, but
rather only on picketing that had a coercive effect on a business.34 2 The
Board pointed out that it is important not to read section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
too broadly, for fear of restricting constitutionally protected activity. 34 3
Although there is no definition of "picketing" in the Act, 344 Board and
332. Id. at *2-3.
333. Id. at *3.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. See id at *5-6.
337. Id. at *6.
338. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (2006).
339. See Eliason & Knuth, 2010 WL 3452309, at *5-6.
340. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568 (1988).
341. See Eliason & Knuth, 2010 WL 3452309, at *5.
342. See id.
343. See id. at *5. See also DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 584 (citing 105 CONG. REc. 15,673
(1959)).
344. Eliason & Knuth, 2010 WL 3452309, at *6.
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Supreme Court precedent has established that the Act restricts only
picketing that consists of union representatives holding picket signs and
marching in front of a business.345 These elements are an important part
of prohibited activity because it creates a context of confrontation for
people entering the businesses' premises.346 In this case, there was no
confrontation with people nearby, therefore the policy interests
undergirding section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) were not relevant.347 Similarly, there
was no element of coercion, since the union's actions did not threaten to
be a direct cause of the secondary employers' operations when they
peacefully stood on the edge of the sidewalks outside of the
secondaries.348
The Board also went through a detailed constitutional analysis. 3 4 9
Again relying on Supreme Court precedent, the Board recognized that
the Court had held that handbilling was not captured by the "threaten,
coerce, or restrain" language from section 8(b).350 In NLRB v. Fruit &
Vegetable Packers & Warehouse Men, Local 760 (Tree Fruits),35 1 the
Court also stated that picketing should only be proscribed by section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) when there is a clear legislative intent against it,35 2 a
requirement that was not met here, according to the Board.353
Because the union's holding of the banner was constitutionally
protected speech and the legislative history behind section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
did not clearly restrict such activity, the Board held that the union had
not violated the Act. 354
The following year, in Sheet Metal Workers International
Association, Local 1,355 the Board applied its reasoning from Eliason &
Knuth to hold that displaying an inflatable rat in front of a secondary
employer was not picketing or coercive activity under Section

345. Id. at *7 (citing United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 2 (Jeddo Coal Co.), 334 N.L.R.B.
677, 686 (2001); Serv. Emps. Union, Local 87, 312 N.L.R.B. 715, 743 (1993); NLRB v. Retail
Store Emps. Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 618-19 (1980) (Stevens, J. concurring)).
346. See Eliason & Knuth, 2010 WL 3452309, at *8; NLRB v. United Furniture Workers of
Am., 337 F.2d 936, 940 (2d Cir. 1964).
347. Eliason & Knuth, 2010 WL 3452309, at *8.
348. See id. at *5.
at*14.
349. See id.
350. See id. at *14 (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575-76 (1988)).
351. 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
352. Id. at 63.
353. Eliason & Knuth, 2010 WL 3452309, at *18.
354. See id.
at *20.
355. 356 N.L.R.B. No. 162, 2011 WL 2097960 (May 26, 2011).
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8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the NLRA.356 In that case, the union displayed a
sixteen-foot tall inflatable rat in front of a hospital that had hired an
Union
employer with whom the union had a primary dispute. 5
members also gave out handbills near the entrance, and one member
stood by a vehicle entrance holding a sign announcing the labor dispute
with the primary employer.358 The case was notable because of the
pervasive use of similar tactics by unions in the twenty-first century.
The giant inflatable rat has become the only contact many people have
with the labor movement, with unions using them at primary and
secondary employers around the country.
After summarizing its previous holding from Eliason & Knuth, the
Board stated that the factual similarity between that case and the present
one allowed the conclusion that the union's conduct should not be
considered picketing or coercive under the Act. 360 As in the previous
case, the union's conduct was more fairly characterized as persuasion,
rather than intimidation. 6 In making this finding, the Board relied on
the fact that the union members were stationary, stayed over a hundred
feet from the hospital's entrances, did not accost people entering the
hospital, and did not carry themselves in a way that could be perceived
as threatening.362 The behavior was not considered coercive for similar
reasons. There were only six union members accompanying the display
and they conducted themselves in a non-threatening way, rather than
shouting, moving, or blocking access to the hospital.363 As in Eliason &
Knuth, the majority noted the "constitutional avoidance doctrine," under
which the Board should attempt to construe the NLRA in a way that
does not impede workers' First Amendment rights.364 In doing so, the
Board referred to the variety of offensive forms of expression that are
constitutionally protected in the United States, holding that the union's
conduct here, including displaying the inflatable rat, should be
under the First
considered protected "expressive activity"
Amendment.
Member Hayes dissented, arguing that the presence of the rat
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

Sheet Metal Workers, 2011 WL 2097960, at *24.
See id at *1-2.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *10 (Member Hayes, dissenting).
See id at *34.
See id at *3.
See id. at *4.
Id at *5.
Id
See id. at *5.
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should be considered picketing, as it is an implicit signal to third parties
that the union had established an "invisible picket line that should not be
crossed.",366
The majority disagreed, interpreting the rat as an
announcement to the public that there was a labor dispute.3 67 Even if
such a message is meant to induce the public to boycott the secondary
employer, the union's activity is protected.3 68 Such conduct would only
be illegal under Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) if it were a signal for employees
of the secondary employer to strike.369 The majority stated that there
was no evidence of a call to strike, noting that no employees at the
hospital stopped working as a result of the union's display.37 0
I. The Wake of Eliason & Knuth
The Board continued to apply the reasoning it had laid out in
Eliason & Knuth in many other cases while Liebman acted as Chair. In
3
Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters,
the Board held that a
union's decision to hold banners at the construction sites of secondary
employers was not picketing or otherwise a violation of section 8(b)(4),
despite the fact that there were workers represented by the union at two
of the sites.372 In determining that the union's banner displays were not
signal picketing, the Board distinguished the factual setting from that in
Warshawsky & Co. v. NLRB,373 where the D.C. Circuit had held that a
union's handbilling had "sought to induce" secondary workers to
strike.374 The Board in Southwest Regional held that the union's conduct
was not a signal to strike because the union did not time its conduct to
parallel worker reporting times, the union did not talk to secondary
workers aside from distributing handbills, no secondary worker stopped
working, and the banners were on roads used by the public. 3 75 As in
other cases, the Board cited Eliason & Knuth heavily as it
simultaneously carved out the specific outline of what was protected
union conduct in relation to secondary employers.376 The majority

366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.

Id at *10 (Member Hayes, dissenting).
Id. at *6.
See id.
See id
Id. at*6n.14.
356 N.L.R.B. No. 88, 2011 WL 341653 (Feb. 3, 2011).
Sw. Reg'l, 2011 WL 341653, at *2-3.
182 F.3d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
Id. at 953.
Sw. Reg'l, 2011 WL 341653, at*6.
See id. at *2-5.
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opinion also emphasized that Eliason & Knuth and similar cases
following it signified the new stance of the Board that peaceful
stationary bannering at secondary employers was not to be considered a
signal to strike absent compelling evidence. 7
In Local Union No. 1827, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America,378 the Board further expanded the discretion left to
unions in Eliason & Knuth.3 7 9 The union in that case had displayed
banners that said "State Farm Insurance, a Greedy Corporate Citizen,"
rather than explicitly announcing a labor dispute.3 80 The banners were
protected by the interpretation of section 7 rights from Eliason & Knuth
as well as the First Amendment oecause the message was clearly
intended to refer to a labor dispute when taken in context.38 1 The union
conduct was also not a violation of the Act when a secondary employer
threatened to take its business elsewhere and a customer of the
secondary employer refused to patronize it. 3 82 A Teamsters local
cancelled its reservation at a secondary employer, and another secondary
wrote a letter to the primary saying that it might be forced to cease using
the primary for future business in light of the union's activity.8 The
Board held that neither response to the bannering showed that the
conduct was coercive, since there was no confrontation involved and no
secondary employee reacted to the banners by stopping work.384 Again,
the Board showed the amount of deference it was willing to allow unions
in their protected right to protest at secondary employers, refusing to
find a violation of the NLRA without clear proof of coercive behavior or
resultant strikes.385
J. Pacific Coast M.S. Industries
In Pacific Coast MS. Industries Co.,386 the Board revisited the
377. See id. at *4 ("[W]e have now decided 10 cases, including this case, involving similar
banner displays conducted by local unions affiliated with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America, and many of the cases involved displays at multiple locations sometimes for
extended periods of time.... The signal the General Counsel alleges is being sent by the banners
does not appear to have been understood as such by any secondary employees.").
378. 357 N.L.R.B. No. 44, 2011 WL 3585516 (Aug. 11, 2011).
379. Local Union No. 1827, 2011 WL 3585516, at *1.
380. Id. at *2.
381. See id.
382. See id.at *4.
383. Id.
384. See id.at *5.
385. See id.at *6, *6 n.17.
386. 355 N.L.R.B. No. 226, 2010 WL 3864538 (Sept. 30, 2010).
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controversial question of which workers should be counted as
supervisors.
The case scaled back the extensive definition of
supervisory employees introduced in Oakwood Healthcare," holding
that workers who have minimal duties related to discipline, scheduling,
and evaluation of other workers are not necessarily supervisors under the
NLRA.8 While the opinion cited Oakwood in coming to its conclusion,
the case stood as another example of the Liebman-led Board undoing
some of the work of the Bush II Board.
After an organizing campaign at the employer's automotive parts
manufacturing plant, the company challenged the votes of several
employees with the status of "team leader" (TL), arguing that the
workers were supervisors under the Act. 38 9 The employer's hierarchy
consisted of general management staff, "group leaders," TLs, and finally
team members, in descending order of authority. 390 Group leaders were
counted as supervisors and team members were employees, leaving the
TLs' status in dispute.39 1 In resolving the question of TLs' status, the
Board began by recognizing the precedent, relied on in Oakwood, that a
worker is a statutory supervisor if she has the authority to carry out or
recommend one of the indicia listed in section 2(11) of the NLRA.392
The Board addressed the employer's argument that the workers should
have counted as supervisors because of their duties in assigning team
members to particular schedules, their role in filling out disciplinary
reports, and their input on employee evaluation forms.393 The Board
held that the employer failed to carry its burden of proof relating to all
three kinds of duties.3 94
TLs were responsible for creating the schedules that team members
followed, which consisted of placing groups of workers into constantly
rotating shifts according to a larger predetermined schedule. 3 95 The
company argued that this task required that the TLs exercise independent
387. See supra Part I.D.
388. See Pac. Coast, 2010 WL 3864538, at *2-5.
389. Id at *1.
390. Id.
391. Id
392. Id. at *2; 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2006) ("The term 'supervisor' means any individual
having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote,
discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust
their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the
exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of
independent judgment.").
393. See Pac. Coast, 2010 WL 3864538, at *2-5.
394. Id at* 5.
395. See id. at *2.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol30/iss1/3

40

Gregory et al.: The Labor Law Jurisprudence of Wilma Liebman

2012]

WILMA LIEBMAN

67

judgment because they assigned certain workers for certain shifts.3 96
The Board, however, was unconvinced, holding that such a task did not
constitute the exercise of independent judgment under Oakwood.3 97
Individual employees were already assigned to specific tasks before TLs
assigned them to work in certain shifts, leaving the TLs to simply fit
each worker into an available shift. 39 8 Rather than evaluating each
worker's respective skills and assigning them likewise, the TLs' task
was routine, requiring no independent decision-making. 399 Further, the
TLs were required to do this only sporadically, rather than being a
regular task upon which team members relied daily. 400
The employer also argued that the TLs' occasional duty to fill out
and deliver disciplinary reports to team members means that they should
be categorized as supervisors.401 However, the Board noted that
employees could also initiate these forms, and that managers were
mainly responsible for delivering the reports and disciplinary warnings
to workers.40 2 Beyond that, the Board held that the employer had failed
to show that the TLs' role in disciplinary procedures affected the
working conditions, employment status, or tenure of any employees
below them.403 The TLs' duties related to discipline were therefore not
404
grounds to count the workers as supervisors.
Finally, the company argued that the TLs' role in evaluating
temporary employees amounted to an effective recommendation to
hire.405 The form that TLs used in evaluating temporary workers had a
final section where they could say whether they recommended that the
worker be hired.406 In reviewing the record, however, the Board relied
on the fact that the TLs who had testified denied ever filling out that
section of the form.407 Because their duties did not include effectively

396. See id
397. Id.
398. See id at *3.
399. See id at *2-3.
400. Id. at *3 ("The early-arriving team members begin work without awaiting [a TL's]
instructions, demonstrating that their daily assignments within the rotation are not dependent on any
independent decision by [the TL].").
401. See id at *4.
402. Id
403. Id.
404. See id.
405. See id
406. Id.
407. See id. at *5 (stating that only one TL testified to using the recommendation section of
the evaluation form and, since that testimony had been discredited, the remaining TL testimony
would be relied upon).
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recommending workers for hire,40 8 the Board found that TLs could not
be considered supervisors on such grounds.4 09
Having rejected the basis on which the employer had argued the
TLs should be regarded as supervisors, the Board demonstrated the
limited effect that Oakwood should have on workers' supervisory status.
While the TLs might have counted as supervisors under the more
expansive reading of the NLRA, Pacific Coast carved out grounds upon
which similar workers could retain protection of their section 7 rights.
K. Rules to Expedite RepresentationElections
Shortly before Liebman stepped down from the Board, the NLRB
proposed new rules that would shorten the period between a union's
request for a representation election and the date of the election. 4 10 The
proposal was to require employers to provide unions with more
information about workers in a bargaining unit and would shift the time
for objections to voter eligibility to the period after workers voted.41 1
Unions had long cited bureaucratic delays as a source of
opportunity for employers to repress worker support for unionization
during the critical period between a request for an election and the vote
itself.4 12 Pro-labor groups applauded the proposed rules as a step away
from antiquated Board procedures and recognized that the shortened
election period would mean less worker intimidation. 4 13 Pro-business
groups, in turn, criticized the proposal as a blatant attempt to help unions
rush towards recognition, suppressing employee free choice.4 14
Supporters of the shortened election procedure had complained that
employers were able to spread an anti-union message any time
employees were at work, and with an expedited election process, the
time that employers had to clamp down on union support would be
reduced.4 15
Although Liebman left the Board in August 2011,416 the NLRB

See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2006).
See Pac. Coast, 2010 WL 3864538, at *5.
See Steven Greenhouse, N.L.R.B. Rules Would Streamline Unionizing, N.Y. TIMES (June
21,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/22/business/221abor.html?_r-0
[hereinafter
Greenhouse, N.L.R.B. Rules].
411. See id.
412. See id.
413. See id.
414. See id.
415. See id.
416. See Steven Greenhouse, New Rules Seen as Aid to Efforts to Unionize, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
408.
409.
410.
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approved a new election procedure several months later that was similar
to the proposals made under Liebman.4 17 The shortened election process
became a source of contention among worker- and business-oriented
groups, mirroring other controversies that the Board sparked while
Liebman was chair. 4 18 Throughout the fighting, Liebman steadfastly
supported the small step towards promoting workers' ability to unionize,
saying, "controversy is unfortunate, but it is not a good reason for the
board to abandon its responsibilities."4 19
One of the most politically contentious cases decided by the Board
during the final days of Liebman's tenure as Chair was Specialty
Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center of Mobile.420 In Specialty
Healthcare, the Board overruled Park Manor Care Center,42 1 a case
which had imported a rule defining appropriate bargaining units in acute
care hospitals into the non-acute care setting, and returned to the
traditional community-of-interest analysis ordinarily used in bargaining
unit determinations.4 22 The Board justified its decision to overrule Park
Manor on the basis of that decision's failure to adequately address the
express terms of the acute care hospital rule and concluded that adhering
to precedent that was wrongly decided was not beneficial.
The
majority also noted that the need for fluidity in responding to the rapidly
changing dynamics of the healthcare industry made abandoning Park
Manor permissible.4 24
The Board then proceeded to apply the
community-of-interest test, albeit characterizing it as an "overwhelming"
community-of-interest test 4 25 and concluded that the union's proposed
bargaining unit was appropriate.42 6
Member Hayes dissented and lamented that the majority had swept
unnecessarily broadly in overruling Park Manor.42 7 Hayes argued that
the Board's erosion of the 1989 acute care rule would destabilize the
balance struck by the regulations governing the formation of bargaining
25,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/26/business/labor-agency-to-require-postingunionization-rights.html [hereinafter Greenhouse, New Rules].
417. See Board Adopts Amendments to Election Case Procedures,NAT'L LAB. REL. BOARD
(Dec. 21, 2011), https://www.nlrb.gov/news/board-adopts-amendments-election-case-procedures.
418. See discussionsupra Part IV.
419. Greenhouse, N.L.R.B. Rules, supranote 410.
420. 357 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 2011 WL 3916077 (Aug. 26, 2011).
421. 305 N.L.R.B. 872 (1991).
422. See id. at 875.
423. Specialty Healthcare,2011 WL 3916077, at *8.
424. Id.
425. See id. at *18.
426. Id. at *20.
427. See id at *21, *28-29.
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units in these hospitals. 4 2 8 He specifically charged that the majority's
decision would lead to the "proliferation of bargaining units," something
Congress had expressly sought to prevent in developing presumptive
rules for bargaining units in the healthcare industry. 429 Because the
community-of-interest test proposed by the majority would likely have
the effect of making it easier to organize healthcare workers, Member
Hayes argued that the decision merely rested on shifting political
accountabilities among the Board members.430

V. CONCLUSION
Wilma Liebman was, and is, the metaphoric Frances Perkins of the
Obama Administration. Her strong and insistent fidelity to the purposes
and policies underlying the National Labor Relations Act while serving
on the Board made her both a catalyst for much-needed change and a
lightning rod for political controversy. Although Liebman personally
accomplished a significant amount during her time as member and then
Chair of the NLRB, she lacked the administrative and Congressional
support that Perkins enjoyed to help carry out the massive overhauls of
the New Deal.431 It is unsurprising that Liebman's gains for workers
were marginal at times given the constraints within which she was
operating and the total legislative gridlock that characterized the early
20 10s.432
Liebman stepped down as Chair of the Board on August 27,
2011.413 She departed the NLRB at a time when the agency was under
extraordinary criticism and the subject of widespread public debate.434
Much of the political controversy at the time grew out of the decision by
the Board's acting General Counsel Lafe Solomon to bring charges
against Boeing for anti-union retaliation in the spring of 2011.435 Boeing
428. See id. at *21.
429. Id. at *24.
430. See id. at *28.
431. See supra note 4.
432. The politics surrounding the Board, and not the Board's decisions, were the center of
focus during this time. See Barbara Morrill, Recess Appointment for CraigBecker to NLRB, DAILY
Kos (Mar. 27, 2010), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2010/03/27/851530/-Recess-AppointmentFor-Craig-Becker-to-NLRB#.
433. See Greenhouse, New Rules, supranote 416.
434. See id
435. See Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board Case Against Boeing Points to Fights to Come,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
22,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/23/business/231abor.html?pagewanted=all
[hereinafter
Greenhouse, Fights to Come].
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had announced that it would start production of its new Dreamliner
planes in a new factory in the right-to-work environment of South
Carolina, rather than its usual factory in Washington.4 36 After several
Boeing executives made public statements that the decision came
partially because of past strikes by its unionized workers in Washington,
Solomon filed a charge against the company for anti-union retaliation.437
He stated that Boeing was moving its operations in response to the
protected striking of its union workers.43 8 While the business had other
reasons for starting operations in South Carolina, the public statements
by its executives led many to believe that the Board's charges against the
company would result in a definitive statement about whether such a
reaction to protected striking violated the NLRA.439
The summer of 2011 saw a widespread bitter cultural reaction to
the charge against Boeing. Republicans in Congress responded to the
Board's charges with vitriol, citing it as an example of government
overreach and the blatant anti-business stance of the NLRB.440
Commentators joined in the chorus against the Board's decision to file
the charge, accusing the agency of a fundamental opposition to the
freedoms of American business. 4 4 1 The Board had its defenders among
some politicians and commentators, but much of the defense was lost in
the months of apocalyptic hand-wringing by the pro-business segment of
political commentary. The Boeing controversy was also folded into the
larger political squabbling over the federal debt ceiling.442 Much of the
invective relating to the Boeing controversy was aimed directly at
Liebman because of her obvious beliefs in the rights of workers to
organize and be protected from the most egregious treatment by their
employers.
The widespread indignation over the charges against Boeing
revealed the extent to which many in U.S. society oppose even the
meager protections offered by federal labor law today. While the
blatantly anti-union maneuvering of Boeing and the boasting by its
executives would have been decried as un-American fifty years prior, in
2011 that criticism was made against the Board for attempting to stop

436. See id
437. Id.
438. Id
439. Greenhouse, BoardDrops Case Against Boeing, supranote 5.
440. See Greenhouse, Fights to Come, supranote 435.
441. See id.
442. See Jeanne Sahadi, Goofy Debt Ceiling Demands, CNNMONEY (June 14, 2011, 2:18
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/06/14/news/economy/debt ceilingdemandslindex.htm.
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such tactics by a business. Antagonism towards the most minimal
promotion of workers' rights was demonstrated further in the months
after Liebman left the NLRB. The Board instituted a rule that employers
must post a statement of workers' rights under the NLRA in an area
where most workers would see it." 3 The Board's rule was met with the
same raging opposition as the charges against Boeing. 4
Although
Liebman had accomplished much in the time she spent on the Board, the
political context that existed in the summer of 2011 and afterwards
remained fundamentally opposed to the most minimal advancement of
workers' rights under federal law.
The Board remains under the public microscope.
Despite
Liebman's retirement and the settlement of the Boeing case, the
resurgence in protection for workers occasioned by the Obama Board's
commitment to more generous readings of the statute has not gone
unnoticed. With the recent appointment of three new members, the
NLRB has the requisite quorum and remains operational. Because the
majority of these members are Democrats,"4 it is safe to assume
Liebman's project will be continued during their tenure.
The outcome of the 2012 presidential and congressional elections
may be a major proving ground in determining the lasting effects of
Liebman's tenure. Significant Republican victories in these elections
may mean the appointment of more pro-employer Board members who
will strive to swing the political pendulum back toward the ideological
pole where the Bush II Board members resided.
Accordingly,
Liebman's efforts to ameliorate the harshness of the Bush II Board's
anti-worker offensive may be undone to some extent. Although this is
possible, Liebman's work is nevertheless commendable because she
made appreciable strides in a short period of time and found
opportunities to generate public discussion of an agency that had long
been relegated to relative obscurity. Despite her political views, she also
embodied effective, responsible leadership and principled decisionmaking. Given her long service as a member and then Chair of the
NLRB, it seems certain that Liebman's influence will have a lasting

443. See Final Rule for Notification of Employee Rights, NAT'L LAB. REL. BOARD,
https://www.nlrb.gov/news-media/fact-sheets/final-rule-notification-employee-rights
(last visited
Nov. 23, 2012).
444. See Greenhouse, New Rules, supranote 416.
445. See Jenny Chang & Gregg A. Fisch, President Obama Appoints Three to NLRB During
Purported
Congressional
"Recess, "
NAT'L
L.
REv.
(Jan.
16,
2012),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/president-obama-appoints-three-to-nlrb-during-purportedcongressional-recess.
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effect on both the policies and procedures of the Board and the broader
conversation about the fate and future of American labor law.
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